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COMMENTARY 
THE LIMITS OF "LIBERAL REPUBLICANISM": WHY 
GROUP-BASED REMEDIES AND REPUBLICAN 
CITIZENSHIP DON'T MIX 
Cynthia V. Ward* 
After decades of remarkable consensus on the need for state inter-
vention to remedy the wrongs committed against disadvantaged groups 
in America, the civil rights coalition has reached a fork in the road. The 
liberal effort to redeem constitutional promises of equality to women 
and minorities has focused on gaining access for those groups to the 
bargaining table of interest-group politics, allowing them the chance to 
press their claims and exert their influence on legislators and adminis-
trators.1 Today, legal and political scholars survey our political land-
scape and proclaim both achievement-the recognition of each citizen's 
equality under the law2-and defeat-the failure to erase race- and gen-
der-based inequalities throughout society.3 While the "discrete and in-
* Yale Law School. I owe many thanks to Bruce Ackerman, for whose class this 
essay was originally written and whose criticism and advice have been invaluable. Akhil 
Amar was also extremely generous with his time and ideas. Responsibility for the views 
expressed is of course mine alone. 
I. See, e.g., j. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of judicial Review 135 
(1980) ("Not long ago the assurances of pluralist political theory, that any group whose 
members were not denied the franchise could protect itself by entering into the give and 
take of the political marketplace, dominated academic political science."); see also A. 
Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 85 (1970) (court's role under plu-
ralist system is to "nullify the exclusion" of disadvantaged groups from political power); 
R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 132 (1956) ("Elections and political competi-
tion do not make for government by majorities .•. but they vastly increase the size, 
number, and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into account by lead-
ers in making policy choices."). 
2. See, e.g., Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Univer-
sal Citizenship, 99 Ethics 250, 267-68 (1989) ("Today ... the social consensus is that all 
persons are of equal moral worth and deserve equal citizenship. • . • [I]n many respects 
the law is now blind to group differences .... "); see also Ackerman, Beyond Carotene 
Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985): 
After a generation of renewed struggle for civil rights .•• it no longer follows 
that the discreteness or insularity of a group will continue to serve as a decisive 
disadvantage in the ongoing process of pluralist bargaining • • . . [D]espite the 
racial and religious prejudices that still haunt our society, Americans have made 
some progress toward a more just polity. 
3. See, e.g.,J. Ely, supra note 1, at 135 (Pluralist bargaining "does work sometimes, 
and minorities can protect themselves by striking deals ..•. But sometimes it doesn't, as 
the single example of how our society has treated its black minority (even after that 
minority had gained every official attribute of access to the process) is more than suffi-
cient to prove."); Young, supra note 2, at 267 ("With the near achievement of equal 
581 
582 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:581 
sular minorities" who were targeted for judicial protection4 have 
gained increasing acceptance at the political bargaining table,5 eco-
nomic and social discrimination persist. Further, this remaining dis-
crimination may be even more intractable, and therefore less easily 
remedied, than the outright denial to women and minorities of equal 
legal rights. Recent scholarship locates the roots of racial discrimina-
tion in unconscious psychological motivations of which discriminators 
may not be aware.6 According to this view, unconscious racism results 
when individuals face a conflict between racist convictions and contem-
porary legal and societal standards that reject those convictions. 7 1f 
this is true, then society must search for ways in which to expose and 
change these unconscious drives if we are to continue moving toward 
the elimination of racism and sexism. 
For legal scholars concerned about inequality, the question is 
where to go from here. Answers have diverged sharply. All acknowl-
edge the achievements of the civil rights movement in improving the 
legal and political status of minorities and women. Some, however, ar-
gue for the abandonment of the equal treatment principle in favor of 
government-enforced acknowledgement of relevant group differences, 8 
while others contend that writing race and gender back into law would 
perpetuate discrimination. 9 
rights for all groups, with the important exception of gay men and lesbians, group ine-
qualities nevertheless remain."). 
4. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Perhaps the 
best-known attempt to expand the Carotene footnote into a theory ofjudicial review isj. 
Ely, supra note 1, at 75-77, 135-79. 
5. See, e.g. Ackerman, supra note 2, at 744-45 ("From City Hall to Capitol Hill, 
black politicians now aggressively represent their constituencies in the citadels of power. 
Similarly, religious organizations are increasingly involved in pressure-group politics." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
6. See, e.g., Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987) (proposing that courts apply "cultural 
meaning" test to determine whether significant proportion of population thinks of a 
government action in racial terms; if so, the courts would presume that unconscious 
racism motivated decisionmakers and apply strict scrutiny). 
7. Id. at 322-23. 
8. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, The Case for Race-Consciousness (forthcoming, 91 Colum. 
L. Rev. (1991)) ("in order to make progress in ending racial oppression and racism, our 
political and moral discourse must move from colorblindness to color-consciousness, 
from antidiscrimination to racial justice"); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Affs. 107, 150-51 (19713) (arguing that antidiscrimination princi-
ple used by Supreme Court in applying equal protection clause should be replaced with 
"group disadvantaging principle," which would employ judicial "redistributive strategy" 
to "improve the status of the group"); see also Comment, Individual Rights and Group 
Wrongs: An Alternative Approach To Affirmative Action, 56 Miss. LJ. 781, 783-94 
(1986) (authored by Lindsey Patterson) (courts and policymakers should acknowledge 
that "individual justice" is inadequate to cure harms to women and minorities and 
should adopt group justice to grant remedies for discrimination based on plaintiff's 
membership in historically disadvantaged group). 
9. See, e.g., Young, supra note 2, at 273 ("Many opponents of oppression and priv-
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Members of the republican revivalist movement have recently ad-
ded their voices to this debate, drawing on communitarian aspirations 
for public-spirited citizenship to propose solutions to discrimination 
and inequality.10 Although significant differences divide these propos-
als, 11 they are united in the attempt to deal with discrimination by in-
corporating into the republican ideal a basic premise of interest-group 
liberalism:12 disadvantaged groups ought to eJ1ioy guaranteed access 
to, and benefits from, the judicial and political processes. Frank 
Michelman, for example, would endow the judiciary with the ability to 
"reach for inclusion of the other, of the hitherto excluded-which in 
practice means bringing to legal-doctrinal presence the hitherto absent 
voices of emergently self-conscious social groups." 13 And Cass 
Sunstein endorses the concept of group representation for disadvan-
taged minorities: acknowledging that such an idea might pose 
problems for a republican community, he nevertheless concludes that 
"proportional or group representation may, in some contexts, be a 
highly desirable reform" that is compatible with the deliberative citi-
zenship that is central to republican theory .14 
This Commentary takes issue with the claim that republicanism can 
incorporate organized disadvantaged groups as separate political enti-
ties into a polity based on deliberation and citizenship. Government-
enforced special treatment for such groups is fundamentally at war with 
the most basic purpose of republican community: to promote the inter-
connectedness of all citizens and their ability to arrive at a collective 
definition of the common good, which the state then implements. If I 
may borrow half a phrase from Robert Cover, by its nature the group-
oriented liberal state is "communo-pathic";15 to survive as an entity 
that is conceptually separate from interest-group liberalism, a republi-
can community must reject "groupthink" altogether. It follows that, to 
ilege are wary of claims for special rights because they fear a restoration of special classi-
fications that can justify exclusion and stigmatization of the specially marked groups." 
Young goes on to disagree with this position.). 
10. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale LJ. 1493, 1529-37 (1988); 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539, 1580-81 (1988). 
11. See infra note 16. 
12. The term is from T. Lowi, The End ofLiberalism: The Second Republic of the 
United States 22 (2d ed. 1979). For a discussion of the concept of liberalism, see infra 
notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
13. Michelman, supra note 10, at 1529. Michelman attempts to escape the 
countermajoritarian difficulty by handing republican-style deliberation over to the judi-
ciary, making it "a bastion of its own self-government" that undertakes the "modeling of 
active self-government that citizens find practically beyond reach." Michelman, The 
Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 
4, 74 (1986). 
14. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1589. 
15. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos And Narrative, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 40 (1983). Cover contends that courts destroy community-generated 
law and are, therefore, 'jurispathic." 
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be taken seriously as a candidate for political adoption, republican the-
ory must produce a new way of responding to the disadvantaged-one 
that promotes public-regarding citizenship while it simultaneously 
works toward the elimination of social inequality. Because it would 
permanently build the communo-pathic features of liberal pluralism 
into our governmental structure, group representation cannot fill the 
need for a republican solution to discrimination. 
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REPUBLICAN POLI'IY 
Republican theories have varied so widely that discussing republi-
canism in the contemporary context, without multiple qualifications, is 
a serious problem.I6 But certain beliefs, centering on the view that de-
liberation among a virtuous citizenry can lead to general agreement on 
the common good, do set apart the republican vision of political inter-
action. 17 The vision implicitly assumes several "communo-generative" 
characteristics about the nature of public discussion and citizenship. 
Given the basics of republican theory, none of them is controversial. 
A. Momentum Toward Connection 
The ideal of contemporary republican citizenship is not initial 
agreement on substantive issues, but belief in the consensual possibili-
16. The theory has been depicted in its classical form as mandating participation 
among virtuous, well-informed citizens "who draw their understandings of themselves 
and the meaning of their lives from their participation with others in a social world that 
they actively and jointly create," M. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis 
of Constitutional Law 10 (1988); in its Madisonian form, as based upon the deliberation 
of virtuous representatives elected by the people but far enough removed from them to 
escape the tyrannies of faction, see, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public 
Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 38-48 (1985) (asserting that Madisonian republicanism "occu-
pies an intermediate position between interest-group pluralism and traditional republi-
canism"); or in some other variant such as Michelman's judge-defended community, see 
Michelman, supra note 13, at 74-75. 
For purposes of this discussion I accept Sunstein's judgment that "[d]espite the 
differences among various forms of republicanism, republican theories tend to be united 
by four central commitments [deliberation, political equality, universalism, and citizen-
ship], and, in any event, it is in these commitments that the contemporary appeal of 
republican thought can be located." Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1548. Sunstein himself 
has taken various positions on what republicanism should be in the United States. He 
has argued for a restoration of Madisonian republicanism, but has also envisioned "a 
departure from the national focus of the New Deal to a system that increases opportuni-
ties for local self-determination and democratic participation" by the citizenry, Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism Mter the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 429 (1987); and, more 
recently, a deliberative polity embracing "the understanding that in their capacity as 
political actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only what is in their 
private interest, but also what will best serve the community in general," Sunstein, supra 
note 10, at 1550 (emphasis added). Thus, Sunstein's four principles involve, at some 
level, the participation of the full citizenry in defining a common good and in building a 
common polity. 
17. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1541, 1548-51. 
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ties of deliberative dialogue. 18 The fundamental connection between 
citizens is not identical conceptions of the good, but the belief that 
agreement can result from free and open interaction. The goal is to 
construct a consensual polity on this procedural foundation. 19 This 
idea has roots in the early republican experiments. J.G.A. Pocock has 
recounted the classical republican view that "depicted human social life 
as a universality of participation rather than a universal for contempla-
tion. Particular men and the particular values they pursued met in citi-
zenship to pursue and enjoy the universal value of acting for the 
common good and the pursuit of all lesser goods."20 
This procedural focus becomes vastly more important when it is 
not supplemented by an insistence on total selflessness or cultural una-
nimity, as it was among the Florentines.21 In contemporary societies, 
where cultural diversity exists among citizens, political community must 
be expansive-geared toward the assimilation of difference-rather than 
separatist or exclusive, geared toward the maguifi.cation and encourage-
ment of difference. To overcome the separatist pull of diversity and 
disagreement, a strong momentum toward political connectedness, 
manifested in a common belief in the possibilities of empathic dialogue, 
is essential if a republican community is to survive. 
B. Empathy 
Momentum toward connection requires the stimulation and devel-
opment of imaginative empathy, a quality enshrined by both Michelman 
18. See, e.g., Epstein, Modem Republicanism: Or the Flight from Substance, 97 
Yale LJ. 1633, 1633 (1988) (criticizing Sunstein and Michelman for "concentrat[ing] on 
process and deliberation to the exclusion of substantive concerns"); Sunstein, supra 
note 10, at 1548-51. Republicans share with other contemporary communitarians their 
focus on the possibilities of talk. See, e.g., B. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory 
Politics for a New Age 173 (1984) ("At the heart of strong democracy is talk."). Where 
appropriate, 1 will include such shared communitarian ideas in this Commentary. 
19. This theme echoes through much of contemporary communitarian thought. 
See, e.g., B. Barber, supra note 18, at 117: 
[Strong democracy] rests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens 
who are united less by homogeneous interests than by civic education and who 
are made capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of their civic 
attitudes and participatory institutions rather than their altruism or their good 
nature. 
20. ]. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition 75 (1975). 
21. 
I d. 
The polity must be a perfect partnership of all citizens and all values since, if it 
was less, a part would be ruling in the name of the whole, subjecting particular 
goods to its own particular goods and moving toward despotism and the cor-
ruption of its own values . . . . The Citizens must in a totally noncynical sense 
accept the adage that one should love one's country more than one's own soul 
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and Sunstein.22 This requirement subsumes the ability not only to rec-
ognize bonds between oneself and others, but also to imagine oneself 
in the position of a person whose starting point is radically different 
from one's own. In a polity that welcomes diversity, such as the repub-
lican revivalists are attempting to construct, this kind of imagination is 
indispensable to the defeat of alienation and separation. 
C. Fluidity 
The republican community must also bejluid; change that creates 
or results in greater equality must be welcomed and, in the process of 
incorporating such change, the community itself is constantly trans-
formed.23 Thus, citizens must be "open to revision even of their most 
fundamental commitments."24 Fluidity must operate at a minimum of 
two levels: by welcoming socioeconomic gains of the disadvantaged, 
and by acting to block those who already have power and recognition 
from denying such attainments to newcomers. 
D. Nonconfrontation 
Implicit in the requirements of assimilation and fluidity is the need 
for nonconfrontation. Connection~oriented republican dialogue seeks to 
avoid outcomes in which one group "wins" over another, an approach 
that suggests tyrannical control over the political process by either a 
22. See, e.g., Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 443,448 (1989) ("Deliberation does presup-
pose a certain kind of civic friendship, an attitude of openness to persuasion by reasons 
referring to the claims and perspectives of others."); Michelman, supra note 13, at 33 
(republican dialogic themes "emphasize openness to 'otherness' as a way toward recog-
nition not only of the other, but also of oneself"); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1555 
(republican belief in deliberation toward a common good partly "depends on a commit· 
ment to political empathy, embodied in a requirement that political actors attempt to 
assume the position of those who disagree"). 
23. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 13, at 31-33 (describing possibilities of ex-
ploratory, empathic deliberation). Benjamin Barber disowns republicanism per se, but 
his vision of strong democracy nevertheless captures the potential of such imaginative 
dialogue by contrasting it with the mere act of voting, the beginning and end of citizen-
ship in the contemporary liberal state: 
Where voting is a static act of expressing one's preference, participation is a 
dynamic act of imagination that requires participants to change how they see 
the world. Voting 'suggests a group of men in a cafeteria bargaining about what 
they can buy as a group that will suit their individual tastes. Strong democratic , 
politics suggests a group of men in a cafeteria contriving new menus, inventing 
new recipes, and experimenting with new diets in the effort to create a public 
taste that they can all share and that will supersede the conflicting private tastes 
about which they once tried to strike bargains. 
B. Barber, supra note 18, at 136-37. 
24. Fallon, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 
1695, 1729 (1989) (summarizing Michelman's theory of republican dialogic process). 
1991] THE LIMITS OF "LIBERAL REPUBLICANISM" 587 
democratic majority or a powerful minority.25 , 
Historically, republicans relied on political exclusion-the restric-
tion of citizenship to those sharing class, gender, and racial back-
grounds-to ensure the kind of connectedness necessary to avoid 
divisive battles and secure general political agreement. 26 Contempo-
rary republican theorists claim that such restrictions are unnecessary, 
that the concepts of citizenship and community can withstand the pres-
sure of debate that begins from diversity and fundamental disagree-
ment. 27 It seems inevitable that in a truly inclusive polity many debates 
over substantive issues would bring divergent views to the table; repub-
licanism must stand or fall on the credibility of its belief that when the 
discussion is over, genuine agreement on the good-rather than a mere 
victory of one group over another-can result. 
E. Reactive State 
When the citizenry as a whole bears the burden of defining a com-
mon good, it must resist the attempts of power-hungry elites to grab 
control. The citizen has a nondelegable duty to participate in the delib-
erative process, whether that process is purely electoral, designed to 
send the most virtuous representatives to the seat of government, or 
25. For an example of the destructive effects of confrontation, see infra notes 85-89 
and accompanying text. 
26. See Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival And Racial Politics, 97 Yale LJ. 
1609, 1610-11 (1988); Epstein, supra note 18, at 1635-36. For example, classical re-
publican theorists tried to avoid the possibility of divisive economic confrontations by 
excluding the poor and propertyless from the citizenry. See, e.g.,J. Pocock, supra note 
20, at 68 (depicting the republican citizen as a male head of household); id. at 386-91 
(describing republican thinker James Harrington's view that property ownership must 
be a prerequisite to citizenship); see also H. Arendt, On Revolution 14-15 (1963) (tak-
ing view that avoidance of debate over material goods has led republicans to exclude the 
"social question"-whether and how to redistribute material resources among the citi-
zenry-from the political agenda). Some American antifederalists, arguing for a more 
inclusive solution, advocated an equal distribution of wealth. See, e.g., "Centinel," No. 
1 (Oct. 5, 1787), in The Anti-Federalist Papers 227, 231 (R. Ketcham ed. 1986) ("A 
republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are virtu-
ous, and where property is pretty equally divided .... "). Professor Sunstein's principle 
of political equality embodies a slightly different view; since "[d]ramatic differences in 
wealth and power are, in [republican theory], inconsistent with the underlying premises 
of a republican polity," the requirement that all groups be included in the contemporary 
republican citizenry means that "[r]epublicans are likely to be highly receptive ... to 
measures designed to reduce the effects of wealth in the political process." Sunstein, 
supra note 10, at 1552. Whether this would require an equal distribution of wealth is an 
open question. If the answer is yes, the realistic possibility of establishing civiC republi-
canism in America narrows considerably. 
27. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1541 (explaining that commitment of"lib-
eral republicanism" to "agreement as a regulative ideal ... takes the form of a belief in 
the possibility of settling at least some normative disputes with substantively right an-
swers"; the theory attaches this principle to that of citizenship, "manifesting itself in 
broadly guaranteed rights of participation"). 
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more directly democratic, designed to produce grassroots consensus 
around substantive issues. 
This duty necessarily implies that the state and its representatives 
will not themselves become an elitist hierarchy exercising creative di-
rection over public values. In a republican community the coercive 
forces of the state must, in a fundamental sense, remain reactive to citi-
zen determinations of the public good.28 State coercion is used not to 
shape the values of the republican citizenry, but rather to implement 
values selected through universal, undominated citizen participation.29 
Change in society, therefore, precedes change in coercive state 
structures.30 
The concept of reactive government has been expressed in various 
forms by liberals and communitarians. Robert Dahl touches on it by 
including as a requirement of "an ideal democratic process" the idea 
that the people as a whole have "[f]inal control over the agenda: The 
body of citizens (the demos) should have the exclusive authority to de-
termine what matters are or are not to be decided by means of [demo-
cratic] processes."31 Civic republicans and other communitarians 
would go even further, working on the idea that "[r]epresentation de-
28. The sense would vary according to the form of republicanism being discussed. 
Under Sunstein's conception of Madisonian republicanism, for example, the people's 
representatives deliberate and enforce values in their name. See Sunstein, supra note 
16, at 38-48. Still, those values are ultimately dependent on a virtuous citizenry, since 
good representatives can only govern if a majority of citizens recognizes and votes on 
the basis of candidates' virtues. 
29. Classical republican conceptions often endow the state with the responsibility 
for inculcating civic virtue into individual citizens. But, presumably recognizing the ty-
rannical potential of such a mandate, "modern republicans invoke civic virtue primarily 
in order to promote deliberation in the service of social justice, not to elevate the char-
acter of the citizenry." Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1550-51. Under this conception, 
civic virtue appears to consist of dedication to the dialogic process and belief in its out-
comes. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
30. This vision is not universally shared. Michelman's conception of republicanism 
appears to grant judges the power to refute majoritarian decisions in the name of their 
conception of public values-an idea that would put the judiciary in the position of di-
recting, or at least prioritizing, such values. Michelman is careful to insist that the judici-
ary itself self-consciously engages in republican deliberation. Michelman, supra note 13, 
at 76-77. Still, this conception could well contradict the idea that the state implements 
rather than determines citizen values. As Derrick Bell points out, Michelman's judicial 
system fundamentally contradicts the principles of republicanism because it "merely re-
produces the tension that runs throughout American constitutionalism . , . , the tension 
between being a government of laws and a government of men, between law-rule and 
self-rule." Bell & Bansal, supra note 26, at 1614, 1617. One is reminded of james 
Thayer's famous criticism of judicial review: It "comes from the outside, and the people 
thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come from 
fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors." J.B. 
Thayer,John Marshall106 (1901). Here, Thayer appears much closer to the republican 
conception than does Michelman. 
31. R. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy 6 (1982) (contrasting this ideal pro-
cess with that prevailing in the pluralist liberal state), 
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stroys participation and citizenship."32 As Benjamin Barber expresses 
it: "[s]trong democracy ... is self-government by citizens rather than 
representative government in the name of citizens. Active citizens gov-
ern themselves directly here, not necessarily at every level and in every 
instance, but frequently enough and in particular when basic policies 
are being decided and when significant power is being deployed. " 33 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM 
In a recent discussion of"liberal republicanism," Frank Michelman 
argues that the deliberative interaction essential to republican commu-
nity can be "fully compatible" with liberal pluralism.34 However, 
Michelman carefully qualifies this statement by noting that "dialogic 
politics"35 could embrace both pluralist and republican interactions 
only if "participants did not try at all costs to protect their prepolitical 
understandings of interests and ends against the possibility of change 
in political conflict or debate and could embrace such changes as exer-
cises of freedom rather than as impairments ofintegrity."36 The prob-
lem is that interest-group liberalism encourages--even demands-the 
very self-focused pursuit of rigid, predetermined interests that 
Michelman assumes away. Examination of our contemporary liberal 
polity37 forces the conclusion that it cannot be reconciled with essential 
32. B. Barber, supra note 18, at xiv. 
33. Id. at 151. One problem, of course, is deciding which issues require such self-
government. 1 will argue below that social inequality and discrimination are particularly 
suited for communitarian resolution. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. 
34. Michelman, supra note 22, at 447-48 ("A deliberative style of politics may be 
confrontational, contestative, and fully compatible with pluralistic political sociology."). 
35. "Dialogic politics" is defined as a subset of deliberative politics that seeks not 
only to promote equal conversational encounters between individuals who share some 
views as to goals of society, but also to bring diverse backgrounds and experiences to 
political debate. 1d. at 450. 
36. Id. 
37. Defining liberalism is a daunting task, especially since scholars employ the con-
cept in various and somewhat contradictory ways. Some use the term "liberalism" to 
describe the "classical liberal," a person who espouses the libertarian idea that the state 
should interfere as little as possible with individual self-interest. See, e.g., Sunstein, 
supra note 10, at 1566. Sunstein goes on, however, to criticize such characterizations of 
liberalism as distorted; he asserts that the liberal tradition is richer than such critics 
describe, embracing positive visions of governmental power and some mistrust of mar-
ket forces. Id. at 1567. 
Scholars have connected pluralist liberalism with the original, "classical" conception, 
see, e.g., Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 
189, 230-32 (1988) (discussing contemporary liberalism, both in politics and academia, 
as "an amalgam of special interests" and noting that this "balkanization ... is, in some 
significant sense, related to the prevalence of individual rights consciousness in liberal 
theory"). I focus on pluralist liberalism because much of the recent debate over "Lib-
eral Republicanism" accepts this vision. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 22, at 445 
(comparing "republican social unitarism" to "liberal pluralism"). Importantly, Cass 
Sunstein's proposal for group representation relies on the pluralist faith in granting 
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features and goals of republican citizenship. 
A. Definitions and Some Relevant History 
Interest-group liberalism38 is based on the theory that "democracy 
is the free interaction of diverse minorities. In a democracy there is a 
struggle for power among a multiplicity of interest groups in which no 
single interest, majority or minority, emerges as a clear-cut winner on 
all issues of concern."39 
It is worth recalling that liberal pluralism was promoted in America 
by some post-war political scientists as a replacement for the Founders' 
reliance on citizen virtue and participation; republican values were be-
lieved to be impractical in an era featuring the rise of the administrative 
state and the increasing power of government overall. As Michael 
Margolis explained, political scientists in the 1950s 
had become increasingly aware of empirical evidence . . . 
which indicated that Americans (and others) failed to live up 
to Jeffersonian standards of rationality. If the survival of de-
mocracy depended upon the modern equivalent of the sturdy 
yeomanry-resourceful citizens exercising independent polit-
ical judgment about the issues of the day-then democracy 
would soon be extinct. But if the burden of support for de-
mocracy were shifted from the individual citizen to organized 
interest groups, the prospects for its survival would look 
brighter.40 
Thus, the promotion of group-based distribution of government bene-
benefits to disadvantaged groups as a way of improving their political strength. See 
infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
I should note that Sunsetein attempts to lift liberalism out of any empirical political 
context and unite it conceptually with republicanism based on his allegation that the two 
philosophies share a belief in deliberation, political equality, citizenship, and universal· 
ism. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1541, 1567-68. But that attempt is meaningless if 
other qualities endemic to liberalism-such as the increasing atomization of interests-
inevitably produce political effects directly opposite to those anticipated by civic republi-
canism. This Commentary seeks to demonstrate such effects. 
38. I use the Lowi term interchangeably with "liberal pluralism" and "group-based 
liberalism." 
39. M. Margolis, Viable Democracy 100 (1979). 
40. ld. at 99. The move away from the citizenship ideal (both by pluralists and their 
critics) was unembarrassed to the point of arrogance, as this expression of elitism 
demonstrates: 
Democracy is government "by the people," but the responsibility for the sur-
vival of democracy in fact rests on the shoulders of elites. . . . If the survival of 
the American system depended on the existence of an active, informed, and 
enlightened citizenry, then democracy in America would have disappeared long 
ago; for the masses of America are apathetic and ill-informed about politics and 
public policy, and they have a surprisingly weak commitment to democratic val-
ues . . . . But fortunately for these values and for American democracy, the 
American masses do not lead, they follow. 
T. Dye & L. Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy 2 (4th ed. 1978). 
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fits was enthusiastically advanced because of a perceived decline in the 
possibility for republicanism in America. 
Pluralist theory provides that as long as all relevant groups have 
equal access to the democratic process, they should be allowed to battle 
among themselves for whatever benefits are forthcoming from the 
state.41 Liberals viewed discrimination against African-Americans and 
other disfavored groups as largely a problem of denial of access for 
these groups to the political bargaining process, and they successfully 
fought to gain such access through legislatures and courts.42 The value 
of these accomplishments cannot be overstated. But the enshrinement 
of group-based liberalism has itself changed the American polity m 
ways antithetical to the republican vision. 
B. The Liberal Polity 
1. Activist State, Reactivist Citizenry. - With regard to contemporary 
pluralism,43 this contention has been thoroughly documented in 
Theodore Lowi's study of interest-group liberalism in America.44 Dis-
cussing the activist role taken by the federal bureaucracy in its attempts 
to help the disadvantaged during the 1960s, Lowi starkly demonstrated 
the results of giving the state a primary, active role in deciding societal 
interests and values. Far from acting as passive referees for competing 
interests, state actors targeted certain groups for aid and then moved to 
create these "interests" as organized entities.45 
41. M. Margolis, supra note 39, at 99. 
42. See, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 1, at 135 (noting the great influence of pluralist 
theory in academic debate on issues of discrimination). Bruce Ackerman, arguing that 
the time has come to replace Carolene-based judicial review theory with more expansive 
judicial protection for "diffuse and anonymous" groups, notes that in the absence of 
such a conceptual move, constitutional theory will become increasingly 
belied by political reality. While constitutional lawyers decry the political 
powerlessness of discrete and insular groups, representatives of these interests 
will be wheeling and dealing in the ongoing pluralist exchange-winning some 
battles, losing others, but plainly numbering among the organized interests 
whose electoral power must be treated with respect by their bargaining part-
ners and competitors. 
Ackerman, supra note 2, at 745. 
43. The pluralism discussed in this section encompasses all groups that target their 
actions toward the winning of government largesse. This includes not only the recently 
empowered representatives of the disadvantaged, but also more traditional groups rep-
resenting entrenched, established economic power. In short, the principles outlined 
here embrace both the NAACP and the National Association of Manufacturers. It will 
become clear, however, that the system acts against the disadvantaged group-and for 
the established power-wielder-in consistent and certifiable ways. 
44. T. Lowi, supra note 12. 
45. The classic depiction of pluralism posits the state as merely providing an arena 
for competition between special interests, as opposed to taking an active role. See, e.g., 
M. Margolis, supra note 39, at 98. Lowi's description of interest-group liberalism dis-
putes this characterization. See T. Lowi, supra note 12, at 226 (noting that throughout 
the War on Poverty, "the ideology of interest-group liberalism was fully in the ascen-
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The War on Poverty illustrates the exclusionary and oligarchic ef-
fects of making state action the focus, rather than the result, of debate 
and discussion: 
When a program is set up in a specialized agency, the number 
of organized interest groups surrounding it tends to be re-
duced, reduced precisely to those groups and factions to 
whom the specialization is most salient. That almost immedi-
ately transforms the situation from one of potential competi-
tion [among groups] to one of potential oligopoly. : . . When 
conflict of interest is made a principle of government rather 
than a criminal act, programs based upon such a principle cut 
out all of that part of the mass of people who are not specifi-
cally organized around values salient to the goals of that pro-
gram. The people are shut out at the most creative phase of policy-
making-where the problem is first defined.46 
The nature of this drive to oligarchy tends to make interest groups 
more responsive to the state than to the people.4 7 
This system had disastrous effects on disadvantaged groups 
targeted for aid by the state in the War on Poverty. 1n particular, the 
focus on winning government dollars created bitter and long-
remembered schisms among African· American leaders eager to gain 
scarce economic benefits for their various constituencies.48 The pros-
pect of federal dollars aggravated communo-pathic tendencies across 
the board.49 
dancy and was taking a more positive posture by intervening to encourage the formation 
of interest groups where they did not yet exist .... The [counterproductive] results were 
a direct function of the interest-group-liberal policy structure."). 
46. Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added). 
47. See, e.g., id. at 60: 
[H]owever true it may be that overlapping memberships exist and that oligar-
chy is simply a way ofleading people efficiently toward their interests, the value 
of these characteristics changes entirely when they are taken from the context 
of politics and put into the context of pluralistic government .... Such tightly 
knit corporate groups as the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), 
the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), [or] the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) ... are no ordinary 
lobbies after they become part of the 'interior processes' of policy formation. 
Even in the War on Poverty, one can only appreciate the effort to organize the 
poor by going back and pondering the story and characters in The Three Penny 
opera. The 'Peachum factor' in public affairs may be best personified in 
Sargent Shriver and his strenuous efforts to get the poor housed in some kind 
of group before their representation was to hegin .... 
48. "The Harlem program ... was something of a disaster. . . . One leader and one 
element of the black community, in Harlem and elsewhere in New York, was set off 
against another, culminating in strenuous battles to create peace. A real culture of pov-
erty was in the making." Id. at 2 I 7. 
49. "In New York City, politics is fragmented; new welfare reinforced the fragmen-
tation. In Chicago, politics is tightly controlled by a political machine; new welfare rein-
forced the machine. The situation in Philadelphia ... seemed to have combined the 
worst features of both .... " Id. at 217-18. 
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For the cause of black equality, the war for government benefits 
was no less than tragic: "New welfare stripped the black revolution of 
its moral superiority. It is one of the tragedies of our time that so many 
black leaders themselves took the War on Poverty as their own .... 
Brought to leadership in an age of interest-group liberalism, they could 
not have chosen worse."5 0 
2. Momentum Toward Separation. - Pluralist groups focus most in-
tensely on gaining access to, and benefits from, the state. Whether the 
issue is a favorable change in the law or a favorable administrative rul-
ing, accommodative dialogue occurs primarily between an arm of gov-
ernment-a legislator or bureaucrat-and group leaders.51 Thus, the 
pluralist system encourages the citizenry to divide itself into groups in 
order to win politically controlled benefits. Most importantly, as it be-
comes more widely perceived that interest groups are winning special 
benefits, the separatist pull grows stronger. James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock have offered a particularly cogent explanation of this 
phenomenon: 
[I]nterest-group activity, measured in terms of organiza-
tional costs, is a direct function of the 'profits' expected from 
the political process by functional groups .... [A]s the impor-
tance of the public sector has increased relative to the private 
sector, and as this expansion has taken the form of an increas-
ing differential or discriminatory impact on the separate and 
identifiable groups of the population, the increased invest-
ment in organization aimed at securing differential gains by 
political means is a predictable result. 52 
When separatism becomes profitable, it grows. The attendant 
need to thicken boundaries between citizens accelerates the communo-
pathic momentum. Among the resulting pathologies is the denial of 
connectedness, manifesting itself politically in the championing of a 
view of diversity that refuses to recognize the possibility of general 
agreement on political goods. 5 3 Critiques of republicanism often ex-
hibit this trait, scoffing at the idea that a heterogeneous society can pos-
sess a general perspective on any substantive issue. 54 This is certainly 
50. Id. at 236. 
51. Dialogue between groups is not accommodative but strategic, designed to win 
the maximum for one's "side" while "giving up" the minimum. 
52.]. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 286-87 (1962). 
53. Discussing this syndrome in the context of party politics, Seymour Lipset has 
noted: 
Parties which are never oriented toward gaining a majority seek to win the 
greatest possible electoral support from a limited base . . . . For these splinter 
parties, elections, instead of being occasions for seeking the broadest possible 
base of support by convincing divergent groups of their common interests, be-
come events in which they stress the cleavages separating their supporters from 
other segments of society. 
S. Lipset, Political Man 80-81 (expanded ed. 1981). 
54. See, e.g., Young, supra note 2, at 262-67: 
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true in a polity whose law and policy are based on separateness-when 
there is no political profit to be derived from building community-but 
it does not answer the republicans' question: How would citizens re-
spond to each other if political incentives were directed away from frag-
mentation and toward connectedness? 
3. Alienation. -As belief in the possibility of general community 
declines, communo-pathic separatism grows as group members begin 
to see everyone outside the group as the "other." The group focus 
turns inward as it attempts to draw more and more of its members' 
sense of identity away from general citizenship and toward total immer-
sion in the group. 55 The result may be extremely damaging to the pub-
lic interest. As Robert Dahl explained: 
[B]y reinforcing civic orientations that encourage group ego-
ism, foster distrust of other groups, and weaken perceptions of 
a general interest more important than the specific concerns of 
each organized group, organizations encourage more serious 
consideration of alternatives that promise visible short-run 
benefits to a relatively small number of organized citizens than 
alternatives that promise substantial long-run benefits to a 
larger number of unorganized citizens. 56 
For groups formed to fight discrimination or inequality, this ten-
dency toward increasing alienation from nongroup citizens may en-
courage a reductionist attitude toward the lives of group members; 
members' identities are reduced to their injuries.57 This attitude 
A general perspective does not exist which all persons can adopt and from 
which all experiences and perspectives can be understood and taken into ac-
count . . . . No one can claim to speak in the general interest, because no one 
... group can speak for another, and certainly no one can speak for them all. 
See also M. Tushnet, supra note 16, at 141 (arguing that there may be no "deep consen-
sus" possible in American society). 
55. See, e.g., S. Lipset, supra note 53, at 79 ("parties reflecting accumulated un-
resolved issues will further seek to isolate their followers from conflictiug stimuli"); 
Ahadi, An Independent Black Political Party: Posing An Alternative To Asses, Ele-
phants and Rainbows, 11 Nat'l Black LJ. ll7, 134 (1989) ("Mrican American people 
must ... build an enduring organization that has a life beyond and outside of politics, 
and which can begin to address other pressing needs in Mrican American communities 
as a way to gain, and keep members."). 
56. R. Dahl, supra note 31, at 47. 
57. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA (Book Review), 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759 
(1987) (reviewiug J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (1986)): As ERA expired on 
June 30, 1982, American women did not riot, but they 
did wipe the asses of children and put them to bed, lurk on streetcomers warily 
until a car circled and slowed and they got in, finish typing the last page of 
transcription for the following day, begin the night shift sewing plastic hand-
bags or cleaning downtown offices, fight for their lives as fist met face and lay 
their lives down as penis sliced in and out and in and out, scurry across the 
street with their eyes down to avoid the man coming the other way, and give up 
on coveringjune's bills. 
Id. at 759. 
This picture of contemporary womanhood has some truth, but one reads on in vain 
1991] THE LIMITS OF "LIBERAL REPUBLICANISM" 595 
manifests itself in a siege mentality toward the outside world, increas-
ing alienation, and an emphasis on oppression, 58 in spite of any pro-
gress that is made. 59 Internally, pressure increases to present a united 
front to perceived outside oppressors.60 Just as invidiously, pluralist 
separation encourages advantaged majority groups-whites or men-
to continue to view minorities as outsiders with whom they can never 
have anything in common. 
Finally, because a disadvantaged group must present a unified 
viewpoint to the world, it becomes associated with that viewpoint to its 
own members and to outsiders; the group's continued oppression is 
measured by whether its adopted viewpoint wins in the bargaining pro-
cess. Victory by those with another opinion becomes proof of contin-
ued domination. Could anything be more antithetical to a deliberative 
discussion that seeks general agreement? 
4. Rigidity.- Groups formed in a pluralist society tend to become 
rigid and resistant to change. Having struggled to obtain public recog-
nition, and convinced of their own good intentions, elites of established 
groups may see newcomers as threats to their hard-won piece of the 
pie. When older groups are able to win access to the coercive power of 
the state, the fear of losing benefits turns into the desire to suppress 
for even a mention of the fact that American women, in increasing numbers, are also 
managing corporations, running for office, and teaching at law schools. Nor is there any 
compassion for the fact that most American men are not professors or CEOs, but proba-
bly spent that same day taking out the garbage, helping the kids with their homework, 
avoiding the bad parts of town on their way home, working the night shift sealing tooth-
paste tubes or cleaning downtown offices, and giving up on covering June's bills. 
58. This complex may have the effect of reinforcing the sense of community within a 
group. It calls up memories of classical republican thought, which was preoccupied with 
the threat of invasion from the outside. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 18, at 1635: "In 
this environment, deliberation and participation were best understood as part of a sys-
tem designed to forge the internal unity and moral cohesion necessary to maintain the 
common defense." Mark Tushnet may have been noting this in his comment that 
"much recent historical work locates the republican tradition in dissenting and 
subordinate groups." M. Tushnet, supra note 16, at 5-6 n.13. If this idea has truth, 
then the job of contemporary republicans is to replace communities based on group 
disadvantage with a national community based on citizenship. 
59. Lowi saw this as a problem with the War on Poverty, which "tend[edl to rein-
force the ghetto in a most systematic way" by giving money and power to representa-
tives of the poor and minorities who were "most strongly pro-ghetto, economics-
oriented, and separatist": 
In a very important sense, the War on Poverty and especially Community Ac-
tion helped bring on black separatism and anti-integrationism by making black 
separation the trait most favored in recruitment and promotion into leadership. 
Federal programs under new welfare did not cause the attitude itself, but they 
did encourage certain types of key spokesmen and leaders. 
T. Lowi, supra note 12, at 235. 
60. See, e.g., Ahadi, supra note 55, at 134 (Blacks "must be able to organize them-
selves into unified, organized power blocs that are capable of delivering their votes to a 
candidate of their choice. They must remain united in the face of attempts to destroy 
the party or siphon off votes to the major parties."). 
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change within the group's sphere ofinterest.61 This desire can be rein-
forced by government bureaucracies, which may resist the disruption of 
their existing relationships with established groups.62 
5. Perpetuation of Hierarchy.- Rigidity of structure takes the exter-
nal form of hostility toward new interests and the internal form ofhier-
archy. Studies of oligarchic structures of voluntary organizations show 
that their leaders often become increasingly distant from the desires of 
ordinary members;63 many leaders are drawn from economic or social 
elites, and become primarily concerned with perpetuating their own 
power in the organization and in society. 64 There is a danger of in-
creasing alienation of the citizens not just from government, but also 
from the groups that were supposed to win them access and represent 
their views before government. In a pluralist democracy, "the ten-
dency toward oligarchy is always there. An organization that success-
fully prevents domination by outsiders may provide the means ... by 
which its own leaders now dominate its members."65 
Ill. REPUBLICANISM V. GROUPISM 
A. The Problem Restated 
The discussion to this point suggests that liberal plura~ism was 
promoted and adopted as a way of advancing democracy while aban-
doning the ideal of public citizenship. 56 However, the internal dynam-
ics of this system result in increasing alienation of the citizen from her 
government. 67 If the possibilities of deliberative community had di-
61. See, e.g., T. Lowi, supra note 12, at 61 ("Old and established groups doing 
good works naturally look fearfully upon the emergence of competing, perhaps hostile, 
new groups."). 
62. I d. at 280 (Interest-group liberalism "is biased not so much in favor of the rich 
as in favor of the established and organized .... [It is] reassuring for [established] inter-
est groups of any sort [because it] respects all skills and all existing social contrivances; 
above all it respects the established jurisdictions of government agencies and the estab-
lished territories of private corporations and groups."). 
63. See, e.g., S. Lipset, supra note 53, at 21-22. 
64. See, e.g., T. Lowi, supra note 12, at 60 ("Programs following the principles of 
interest-group liberalism tend to create and maintain privilege; and it is a type of privi-
lege particularly hard to bear or combat because it is touched with a symbolism of the 
state. Interest-group liberalism is not merely pluralism but is sponsored pluralism."); M. 
Margolis, supra note 39, at 118 (noting that (1) "there is bias in the class membership of 
groups. Those of lower socio-economic status-whether measured by income, occupa-
tion, education or any combination of these-tend to be excluded from participation" 
and (2) "group leaders, lower status or otherwise, tend to form a class apart from their 
followers. Even among well-organized affluent groups, initiative normally devolves 
from followers to leaders."). 
65. R. Dahl, supra note 31, at 36. 
66. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 37-65; see also T. Lowi, supra 
note 12, at 62 (purpose of promoting group-based liberalism in government "was to 
deal with the problem of power-to bring the democratic spirit into some kind of psy-
chological balance with the harsh reality of government coerciveness"). 
67. See, e.g., T. Lowi, supra note 12, at 62 ("Interest-group liberal solutions to the 
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minished before the advancement of pluralist ideology, the continued 
dominance of that model makes resurrection of public citizenship even 
more unlikely. Interest-group liberalism is not merely in conflict with 
republican community, it destroys such community.68 
Republican theory sees the state as the creation of the citizenry, 
which uses government to implement its decisions on the common 
good; liberal groupism allows the state to act as either the creator or 
the prioritizer of public values. The group's job is to create access for 
its members to the state and to persuade government actors to respond 
to the group's perceived interests. 
While republican citizenship assumes a momentum toward com-
munity in order to overcome separatist drives, pluralist theories de-
mand clearly defined and maintained separation between groups. 
Moreover, the momentum under pluralism is toward further separa-
tion; as a group seeks to enclose more and more of the identity of mem-
bers within its boundaries, the basis for common citizenship continually 
erodes. 
While republican community requires imagination and empathy, 
interest-group liberalism encourages isolation and a sense of "other-
ness." Those who would build bridges toward commonality are often 
seen as traitors;69 the implicit ideal becomes unity of purpose in oppos-
ing the enemy-the world outside the group. 
While citizenship demands the expansion-oriented willingness to 
change political and social structures, group-based systems become in-
creasingly rigid, hierarchical, and elitist as groups develop separatist 
institutional structures that take on a life and momentum of their own. 
One result is to exclude new groups from the political arena; another is 
to alienate the average member from contact with both her elected rep-
resentatives and her group leaders, thereby leaving her with no effective 
citizenship status at all. 
While republican dialogue seeks to avoid situations in which 
groups of citizens are humiliated by defeat or elevated over others by 
dialogic victory, pluralist debate makes such warlike competition inevi-
table. As unity-conscious groups publicly affiliate themselves with cer-
tain opinions, the ultimate adoption of other opinions becomes the 
result not of consensus, but of domination and oppression by outsid-
ers. This reinforces the separatist momentum of group activists. 
problem of power provide the system with stability by spreading' a sense of representation 
at the expense of genuine flexibility, at the expense of democratic forms, and ultimately 
at the expense oflegitimacy."). 
68. See, e.g., L. Gerber, The Limits of Liberalism 347 (1983) ("[T]he process of 
bargaining between special interest groups which has become the essence of pluralism 
represents almost the antithesis of public planning for common goals." (emphasis 
added)). 
69. See, e.g., Ahadi, supra note 55. 
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B. A Dualist Solution? 
One way to avoid a total opposition of republican citizenship and 
interest-group liberalism is to envision a separate role in our political 
system for both. Bruce Ackerman, for example, claims that the Consti-
tution embodies such a dualistic conception of politics. During normal 
periods, pluralist bargaining can remain the order of the day, as "fac-
tions try to manipulate the constitutional forms of political life to pur-
sue their own narrow interests."70 However, our political system is 
periodically shaken by "constitutional moments" that feature wide-
spread public mobilization and the temporary triumph of national citi-
zenship over interest-group negotiation.71 In short, the Ackerman 
model posits a role for both republican community and group-based 
separatism. While "there can be no hope of capturing the living reality 
of popular sovereignty during periods of normal [pluralist] politics, "72 
we can create a space for national citizenship through a "democratic 
constitution that tries to economize on virtue"73 by taking constitutional 
cognizance of changed public values only when We The People show, 
through abnormally high levels of mobilization and self-conscious citi-
zenship, that we really mean it. 
The problem is that group-based separatist politics does not 
merely exist as oil to the water of public citizenship; it acts like a corro-
sive on metal, eating away at the ties of connectedness that bind us 
together as a nation. It is not simply communo-repellant; it is com-
muno-pathic. 74 
If this is true, we would expect the dominance of liberal pluralism 
to have undermined the dualist system over time. And in fact, it has 
done so. As Ackerman acknowledged, the classical system of constitu-
tional change has been increasingly substituted for an "evolving system 
of transformative [presidential] appointment" to the Supreme Court 
modeled after Franklin Roosevelt's successful attempt to overcome the 
Court's reactionary orientation in the 1930s.75 Ackerman argues that 
this system, under which membership on the Supreme Court becomes 
highly vulnerable to the kind of interest-group bargaining that charac-
70. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering The Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 
1013, 1022-23 (1984). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1028. 
73. Id. at 1031. 
74. Ackerman's theory is more descriptive than prescriptive; my point is that, even 
assuming for argument's sake that the Framers did intend to build dualism into the 
Constitution, the higher lawmaking track may have collapsed into the pluralist one 
under the pressure of group-based bargaining. If so, we can no longer rely on "consti-
tutional moments" to retrieve a national community from the everyday reality of separa-
tist pluralism. 
75. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1164, 1181 
(1988). 
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terizes "normal politics,"76 must he changed to avoid the danger that 
the Constitution will be modified through "transformative appoint-
ments" without the endorsement of the national citizenry.77 Such a 
system deprives our Constitution of any claim to honor the sovereignty 
of We The People, since it allows the future of that document to be 
driven by the desires of elites in the government and in interest groups 
surrounding it, without the necessity for open-ended debate and con-
sent from the general populace.7s 
In general, it is a valid question whether Ackerman's higher law-
making track even exists in contemporary America. Certainly, many if 
not most of the issues that have in effect modified the Constitution in 
recent decades-the Civil Rights Act of 196479 is an obvious example-
have been carried by strong, well-organized groups to Capitol Hill and 
enacted through the normal, special-interest style of politics either in-
stead of or in addition to constitutional amendments. Whether such 
statutes were endorsed by We The People acting as a national commu-
nity is, to say the least, debatable. In an era when political pressure 
groups picket the Supreme Court and use their access on Capitol Hill 
or in the White House to lobby for or against appointments to that 
Court, the subordination of constitutional citizenship to pluralist poli-
tics appears indisputable. 
IV. BEYOND THE "GROUP DISADVANTAGING PRINCIPLE": A REPUBLICAN 
ANSWER TO INEQ.UALITY? 
A. The Challenge 
No political theory could or should be taken seriously in America 
today if it cannot credibly promise to lead to an end of inequality and 
discrimination. The question then becomes, is there such a thing as a 
communo-generative solution to the problems confronted by women, 
African-Americans, lesbians and gay men, and other groups in our 
society? 
B. Community and Equality 
A sound case can be made for an affirmative answer. While it 
would be difficult to provide a detailed description of what problem-
76. The battle over the Bork nomination, which featured intense lobbying of Sena-
tors by powerful and well-organized interest groups, offers a dramatic example of this 
danger. 
77. Ackerman, supra note 75, at 1181 ("So long as [presidents] can convince a bare 
majority of the Senate to consent to transformative appointments, constitutional law 
may be jolted onto a new course without persuasive institutional evidence that a mobil-
ized majority of the American people endorse the change."). 
78. Id. at 1182. 
79. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.). 
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solving under civic republicanism would look like, 1 will try to outline 
some necessary characteristics. 
First, state coercion must be divorced from group-based politics. 
As long as the activist state is allowed to arbitrate group demands and 
distribute group remedies, the incentives to form, rigidify, and separate 
from the community will be overwhelming. Basic freedoms of associa-
tion demand that people be allowed to organize if they so desire, but in 
a republican society the state-generated incentive to do so would be 
removed. Government agencies and legislatures would be designed to 
respond not to faction but to consensus, as indicated by referendum or 
by other similar means. Absent the constraints of state-endorsed rigid-
ity, new groups would be free to enter and exit public debate as 
problems arise. 
This necessarily implies that the state would be forbidden to be-
come the sculptor of public values. In a republican polity, the coercive 
force of government would be returned to a reactive mode in solving 
societal problems. Whether a problem has heen referred hy consensus 
to the legislative or administrative hranch, government actors would 
not have the mandate to create interest groups where they do not exist, 
would not exceed the boundaries of public consensus, and would not 
be able to take it upon themselves to act hased on their "expert" evalu-
ations of what the people ought to think or be. 
Second, groups that do form to respond to basic problems in soci-
ety would be temporary. In a community oriented toward connected-
ness, public pressure would pull against rigid division. Obviously 
problems exist, and people should try to solve them. However, they 
would be solved in an atmosphere of connectedness and empathy, with 
the momentum toward common agreement rather than confrontation. 
Third, such groups would be issue-oriented, rather than member-ori-
ented. They would be organized to solve specific problems-such as 
wage differentials or promotion practices-not to isolate separate 
groups of people behind an agenda that reinforces immutable differ-
ences. For example, such a principle would favor groups organized to 
fight for comparable worth or the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
C. The Potential 
A system possessing these features might go a long way toward 
remedying inequality while preserving community. First, it would pre-
serve the momentum toward connection by decreasing the incentives to 
separate, by emphasizing the possibilities of progress through good-
faith agreement, and by ensuring that the focus of groups that do form 
is on prohlem-solving, not on alienating others. 
Second, it would encourage empathic relations between citizens 
since problem-solving would not take place against a background of 
alienation, but against a background of connectedness. Public debate 
would not embrace the principle '_'I am different from you," but merely 
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"I have a difference with you." Society would confront and deal with 
inequality, but inequality would be broken down by issue rather than by 
person. 
Third, this system would be fluid; the lack of state-backed incen-
tives to rigidify would leave the community open to the continual entry 
of new groups into the public discourse. The formation and perpetua-
tion of internal group elites would also be discouraged; indeed, the 
temporary, issue-oriented nature of groups would not give such hierar-
chies the time or opportunity to consolidate power. 
Finally, this system would be nonconfrontational; the incentive 
would be not to magnify unbridgeable differences but to solve 
problems, a process that requires understanding, compassion, and 
interconnectedness. 
D. The Discrimination Issue: The Equalizing Force of Dialogue 
Critics of communitarianism in general, and civic republicanism in 
particular, complain that our social problems have become too complex 
and technical even to be grasped, let alone solved, by the citizens at 
large. What, the skeptic may ask, is the most communo-generative level 
of air pollution, and how likely is it that the public will master the scien-
tific information necessary to make an informed judgment on this vital 
issue? 
The answer is that it does not have to. Too often the critic attacks 
with an ali-or-nothing scenario; either all decisions must be made 
through pluralist bargaining with representatives and administrators, 
or everything must be handled through community deliberation. Why? 
If the goal is to increase societal integration and reawaken a sense of 
national community, then direct self-government by citizens would fo-
cus on those issues that tend to maximize such qualities. In Barber's 
strong democracy, for example, "[a]ctive citizens govern themselves di-
rectly here, not necessarily at every level and in every instance, but fre-
quently enough, and in particular, when basic policies are being 
decided and significant power is being deployed. "8° This is another 
way of saying that final control of the agenda remains with the people 
and their representatives, and administrators know it. In fact, one can 
imagine a gradual transfer of decision-making power from state to citi-
zenry as inclusion is maximized through communo-generative educa-
tion and poverty programs. The public may not have the expertise to 
decide which chemicals should be banned from expulsion into the air, 
but it can decide, based on general, digestible information on the harms 
caused by pollutants, how much of our resources should be devoted to 
eradicating air pollution.s1 
Problems of social equality seem appropriate for solution by com-
80. B. Barber, supra note 18, at 151. 
81. Barber envisions this type of gradual transfer; his neighborhood assemblies 
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munity deliberation. First, the issue is one whose important dimen-
sions are clear to any reasonably intelligent citizen; it requires no 
special expertise. Second, the focus of deliberation is talk, and talk (as 
many theorists have pointed out)82 in an undominated setting confers 
actual equality over all conversants. All citizens, whatever their race, 
gender, or income level, would have an equal right to present their 
views and have them heard; the very process of dialogue would there-
fore be a powerful equalizing force. 
Third, "dialogic politics"83 may offer the law an institutional 
method of reaching into individual minds to challenge unconscious ra-
cism. The pluralist liberal state focuses on securing equal legal rights 
for approved groups, but leaves the psychological motivations of pri-
vate citizens untouched. A polity based on republican dialogue, on the 
other hand, obligates citizens to open themselves, on a basis of com-
plete equality, to empathic communication with those of different back-
grounds. Such a process, requiring each individual to expose her own 
perception of her interests to public view, would be far more likely to 
uncover improper race or gender biases that may have been lost to the 
individual's conscious mind. 
Finally, the dialogic focus of a republic~n polity is likely to ac-
knowledge differences while simultaneously emphasizing commonality. 
Politics in a functioning community encourages not only the talking, but 
also the listening faculty which calls upon participants to hear the strains 
of commonality in their dialogue, as well as those of difference. 54 
It is true that dialogically weak individuals may prefer to form 
groups and choose representatives to voice their views to the commu-
nity, and that this may reproduce problems of intragroup rigidity and 
hierarchy. In other words, groups formed around contested issues may 
become hostile and rigid-witness the abortion batde. The key here 
may be the republican shift in focus from a war for government access 
to community discussion and debate. Discussing the rigidifying effect 
of the federal abortion decisions-particularly Roe v. Wade 85-on the 
debate over that divisive issue,86 Guido Calabresi captures the force of 
this idea, noting that prior i:o Roe, "there was no great fuss over the 
laws (which existed in virtually every state) permitting abortions to save 
a woman's life .... [T]hough from the standpoint of pure anti-abortion 
metaphysics they had to be unacceptable, they were accepted without 
would initially have only deliberative functions, eventually acquiring legislative ones as 
the education and deliberation levels of the citizenry rose. 
82. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, Socialjustice in the Liberal State 15-18 (1980) (discuss-
ing relationship between neutral dialogue and equality). 
83. The term is from Michelman, supra note 22. 
84. B. Barber, supra note 18, at 175. 
85. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
86. G. Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 91-114 (1985). 
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any major conflicts."87 But the Court's decision in Roe "said to a large 
and politically active group: 'Your metaphysics are not part of our con-
stitution,' " thereby throwing the weight of government behind one 
conception of the good and intensifying and rigidifying the batde 
lines.88 This might have been avoided had the Court acknowledged the 
claims and feelings of antiabortionists as a legitimate voice in the com-
munity, even while overruling them.89 
This type of compromise and compassion is exactly the kind of re-
sult anticipated by republican deliberation. Empathic discussion may 
feature disagreement, but at the least it acknowledges and respects the 
views of others. Calabresi's point-that such acknowledgement takes 
much of the sting from a community decision not to adopt one's 
views-has some power. 
Unfortunately, some scholars of racial discrimination appear to 
have given up on the possibilities of equal dialogue and respect, and 
are working to build group-based power politics into the permanent 
fabric of our government. Astoundingly, republican revivalists are try-
ing to join them. 
V. WHY GROUP REPRESENTATION Is COMMUNO-PATHIC 
Frustrated by the continued failure of law and politics to equalize 
the economic status of disadvantaged groups,90 some have called for 
group representation in governmental bodies.91 Advocates of this ap-
87. Id. at 99. 
88. Id. at 95. A more recent example of this dismissive attitude occurred in Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (claim of constitutional right to engage in consen-
sual homosexual sodomy was "at best, facetious"). 
89. G. Calabresi, supra note 86, at 98. 
90. See, e.g., Bell, Mter We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-
Racial Epoch, 34 St. Louis U.LJ. 393, 393-94 (1990) (citing statistics showing that in 
areas of poverty, unemployment, and income, "the slow racial advances of the 1960s 
and 1970s have ended, and retrogression is under way"). 
91. See, e.g., Bell, Higgins & Suh, Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of 
Liberation, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 1037, 1090-91 (1990) ("The solution must come from 
proportional representation, not the remedies of the Voting Rights Act."); Young, supra 
note 2, at 258-67 ("Until and unless group oppression or disadvantages are eliminated, 
political publics, including democratized workplaces and government decision-making 
bodies, should include the specific representation of those oppressed groups, through 
which those groups express their specific understanding of the issues before the public 
and register a group-based vote."). 
Calls for proportional or group representation take many forms, not all of them 
directly related to disadvantaged groups. See, e.g., Note, Choosing Representatives by 
Lottery Voting, 93 Yale LJ. 1283, 1284 n.3 (1984) (advocating form of group represen-
tation that would benefit not only racial and ethnic minorities but all demographic 
groups that "have been systematically denied fair representation in legislatures gov-
erned by current electoral rules"); Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional 
Representation, 94 Yale LJ. 163, 164 n.4 (1984) (noting differences in definition of 
proportional representation among theorists and Supreme Court decisions). This Com-
mentary uses the terms "group" and "proportional" representation only to refer to pro-
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proach cite the failure of even highly mobilized minority groups to elect 
representatives of their race or ethnic background to office92 as evi-
dence that vote-based domination by whites will end only if Mrican-
Americans and other disadvantaged minorities are explicitly repre-
sented by race or ethnic background in legislative bodies.93 
Cass Sunstein has declared that such a system, which would build 
racial or ethnic differences into our permanent government structure, 
is consistent with modern republicanism. Sunstein recognizes potential 
dangers from proportional representation if inserted into a pluralist 
system,94 but dismisses them with the statement that "efforts to ensure 
proportional representation become much more plausible if they are 
justified on republican grounds."95 The reason he gives is that "delib-
erative processes will be improved, not undermined, if mechanisms are 
instituted to ensure that multiple groups, particularly the disadvan-
taged, have access to the process."96 
At root, group representation accepts the notions that: (1) the 
political interests of racial and ethnic minorities are irreducibly op-
posed to those of the white majority, and (2) that only members of such 
groups are capable of understanding or representing those interests in 
government.97 But these claims are at war with the most fundamental 
principles of deliberative community among equal citizens. If these 
claims are true, republican hopes for a revival of dialogic empathy be-
tween equal citizens are doomed. The very idea of irreducibly opposed 
interests is anathema to the republican sensibility; if it is impossible for 
citizens of diverse backgrounds to work together toward some common 
posals for the explicit, permanent membership in political bodies by disadvantaged 
minorities. 
92. See, e.g., Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in Minority Vote 
Dilution I, 1-5 (C. Davidson ed. 1984) (describing repeated failure of African-Ameri-
cans and Mexican-Americans in Taylor, Texas to elect persons belonging to either 
group to local office). 
93. See, e.g., Bell, Higgins & Suh, supra note 91, at 1090-91. 
94. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1587-88 (proportional representation threatens "to 
ratify, perpetuate, and encourage an understanding of the political process as a self-
interested struggle among interests"). 
95. Id. at 1588. 
Alternatively, Frank Michelman's system requires "plurality" in the courts as a way 
of ensuring that dialogic inclusion of "the other" takes place, see Michelman, supra note 
13, at 76-77. Michelman, however, does not go so far as to argue for the permanent 
allocation of judicial seats to members of disadvantaged groups; I therefore focus this 
discussion on the Sunstein proposal. 
96. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1588. 
97. See, e.g., id. at 1587 (fhe various proposals for proportional representation 
rest on one basic conviction: "If interests are irreducibly opposed, the remedy for polit-
ical life consists in providing mechanisms for group representation, not in arguing in 
favor of pursuit of the common good."). Sunstein would apparently accept this idea; he 
argues for group representation as a way of "ensur[ingl that processes of deliberation 
are not distorted by the mistaken appearance of a common set of interests on the part of 
all concerned." ld. at 1588. 
1991] THE LIMITS OF "LIBERAL REPUBLICANISM" 605 
good, separatist wars between permanently embattled groups are 
inevitable.98 
Professor Sunstein argues that the purpose of proportional repre-
sentation "is not primarily to allow each group to have its 'piece of the 
action'-though that is not entirely irrelevant-but instead to ensure 
that processes of deliberation are not distorted by the mistaken appear-
ance of a common set of interests on the part of all concerned."99 But 
as the preceding analysis demonstrates, 100 when groups are allowed to 
build themselves into institutional permanence as representatives of 
certain interests, getting a 'piece of the action' becomes a top priority, 
one that inevitably trumps communitarian empathy. 
A system of group representation would retain the state as the fo-
cus of group desires. That system would reinforce the pluralist state's 
role as the active agency through which socialjustice is achieved, mak-
ing it less likely that citizens will take seriously their duty to regard and 
treat each other as equal human beings who have the capacity to agree 
on, and work toward, common societal goals. 101 
In addition, proportional representation would dramatically mag-
nify the incentives to form strong groups with separatist interests,102 
because this would be the clearest route to winning benefits from the 
state. In this sense, group representation is even more communo-
pathic than our current form of interest-group liberalism, which at least 
requires grass-roots citizens' groups to bargain with and form coali-
tions with each other in order to elect candidates to offi.ce.I03 
98. Indeed, Sunstein appears to acknowledge the force of this point in the early 
part of the same article in which he advocates group representation. See id. at 1550 
("The antonym of [republican] deliberation is the imposition of outcomes by self-inter-
ested and politically powerful private groups . . . . The requirement of deliberation is 
designed to ensure that political outcomes will be supported by reference to a consensus 
(or at least broad agreement) among political equals."); see also id. at 1549 ("The re-
publican position is ... that existing desires should be revisable in light of collective 
discussion and debate."). 
99. Id. at 1588. 
100. See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text. 
101. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1541 ("The republican commitment to 
universalism, or agreement as a regulative ideal, takes the form of a belief in the possi-
bility of settling at least some normative disputes with substantively right answers."); id. 
at 1548 ("the republican conception of political freedom . . . prizes collective self-
determination"). 
102. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), in which justice Ste-
yens asserted that there is no constitutional right to proportional representation by ra-
cial minorities, in part because 
there is no national interest in creating an incentive to define political groups 
by racial characteristics. But if the Constitution were interpreted to give more 
favorable treatment to a racial minority alleging an unconstitutional impair-
ment of its political strength than it gives to other identifiable groups making 
the same claim, such an incentive would inevitably result. 
Id. at 86-89 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
103. See, e.g., Young, supra note 2, at 264-65 (drawing a distinction between such 
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The rigid and permanent structure of proposals for group repre-
sentation would also intensify their communo-pathic nature. While a 
community of republican citizens focuses on solving problems against a 
background of trust and dialogic equality, group representation puts a 
premium on hostility and confrontation. It denies that citizens from 
diverse backgrounds can ever understand or fulfill each other's needs 
and announces that real empathy can only occur between those whose 
skin is the same color or who share the same gender. The hope of 
creating or increasing cross-racial or cross-gender empathy through 
equal dialogue-of generating a momentum toward connection among 
all citizens-is abandoned, while the move toward separation created 
by this form of groupism drives the vision of empathic and equal citi-
zenship further away from the realm of possibility. 
Finally, group representation is the epitome of member (as opposed 
to issue) oriented politics. Indeed, such a system would tend to fore-
close the very possibility of perceiving or trying to solve problems of 
poverty and political access from a perspective unrelated to race, gen-
der, or sexual orientation. Group-based remedies for poverty, for ex-
ample, might actually obscure from public attention the fact that 
poverty may have become less race-related, and more class-related, in 
recent decades.104 Although we have learned that poverty will be a 
most difficult problem to solve, 105 republican community must attempt 
to confront it outside the framework of racial, gender, or other immuta-
ble differences that make it difficult or impossible for citizens to trust 
and talk to each other. 
In short, group representation is deeply destructive of successful 
republican community. It derives from-and thrives on-the pluralist 
notion that diversity can be acknowledged and empowered only 
through constant political batde pitting the races and genders against 
each other in a never-ending contest for recoguition and public bene-
fits. If such a system is necessary to achieve equality, then the civic 
republicans are hopeless dreamers and the idea of public citizenship is 
no longer functional in America. 
"traditional coalitions," which establish some area of strategic agreement as a base for 
political action, and specific institutional representation of oppressed groups). 
104. According to sociologist William julius Wilson: 
[A]lthough racial oppression, when viewed from the broad perspective of his-
torical change in American society, was a salient and important feature during 
the pre-industrial and the industrial periods of race relations in the United 
States, the problems of subordination for certain segments of the black popula-
tion and the experiences of social advancement for other~; are more directly 
associated with economic class in the modern industrial period. 
W. Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race 144 (1978). 
105. See, e.g., W. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged 118-24 (1987) (despite efforts 
to eradicate poverty through welfare programs, the fate of the poor continues to depend 
on movements of economy at large). 
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CoNCLUSION 
Some academic observers have apparently accepted the impossibil-
ity of republican citizenship.l06 It is not surprising that visions of na-
tional community, even those that do not demand the razing and 
complete reconstruction of society, may appear unattainable to a mind 
raised on group-based separatism. Indeed, it may be the transitional 
issues that ultimately defeat the republican ideal.107 How are we to 
move from a society in which group identification has become essential 
to social power, to one that reaches beneath differences of race, gender, 
and ethnicity to draw on our common humanity? Minorities and wo-
men have fought hard for equal access to the pluralist bargaining table; 
many are understandably reluctant to put group rights up for grabs108 
without concrete evidence that the non group citizenry is capable of em-
pathizing with their plight and is willing to take action against remain-
ing inequality. In the absence of such empathy, high-sounding visions 
of togetherness are apt to dissolve at the first sign of trouble; a threat to 
a separable part of the citizenry will not draw the rest around in protec-
tive defense, but instead will send everyone rnnning back to the 
trenches. 
There is no denying that these concerns have truth. The defender 
of civic republicanism can only respond by pointing out that interest-
group liberalism breeds its own problems; that its own internal dy-
namic may make these problems worse over time; and that a renewed 
emphasis on developing public citizenship may at least counterbalance 
the communo-pathic alienation and separatism that inevitably charac-
terize the pluralist system. 
106. See, e.g., Freeman & Mensch, A Republican Agenda for Hobbesian America?, 
41 Fla. L. Rev. 581, 590 (1989) (asserting that "with the ratification of the Constitution, 
the American people irretrievably alienated their sovereignty, surrendering to 
institutionalism"). 
107. See, e.g., Cook, The Postmodern Quest for Community: An Introduction to a 
Symposium on Republicanism and Voting Rights, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 409, 440-41 (1989) 
(noting that Michelman "seems to join a long list of critical thinkers who point out the 
possibilities of alternative forms of community without providing some indication as to 
what is required to move from community A to community B," and discussing need to 
connect such academic debate to real-life struggles of marginalized minorities). 
108. As civil republicanism requires, see, e.g., Michelman, supra note 22, at 451 
(discussing the "distinctively republican conception of laws and rights as always and 
unresolvedly open to political reconsideration"). 
